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J.

RODNEY JOHNSON

The Optimum Marital Deduction Survives
the Tax Reform Act

EVERAL years ago an article appeared in the
pages of this journal which suggested that those
attorneys who regularly focused on obtaining the
maximum marital deduction in the wills they were
drafting for their clients might be suffering from a
form of estate planner's myopia. 1 That is, they were
losing sight of their ultimate goal of minimizing the
total estate tax burden imposed on the husband's
assets as they pass from him, through the wife, on to
the ultimate beneficiaries. The danger foreseen was
that, as an attorney employed one of the various
formula clauses designed to obtain every possible
dollar of marital deduction at the husband's death,
the attorney might also unwittingly and unnecessarily
increase the estate tax burden at the wife's later
death. A study based on a computer simulation of
28,000 cases was referred to which indicated that ( 1)
drafting for the maximum marital deduction would
have been appropriate in only 10% of the cases
whereas ( 2) the marital deduction should not have
been used at all in 55 % of the cases and ( 3) the
entire estate should have been transferred to the wife
in 21 % of the cases. Accordingly, it was concluded
that •instead of striving for the maximum marital
deduction, the attorney should be searching for the
optimal transfer from husband to wife-the amount
that will "set the stage," so to speak, for the lowest
overall estate tax bill for husband and wife together,
even though this amount may not take full advantage of the marital deduction.

S

Sometimes it is much easier to devise a theory
which will solve a problem than it is to implement
that particular theory from a practical standpoint.
1 Johnson, Drafting for the Optimum Marital Deduction,
I Va. Bar Assn. J. 3 (July 1975).
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And the practical problem in drafting for the optimum marital deduction is that all of the variables
which it is necessary to resolve in order to determine
the amount of the optimum transfer from the husband
to the wife are all unknown at the time the husband's
will is drawn. These variables include, among others:
( 1 ) the size of the husband's estate at the time of his
death, ( 2) the size of the wife's estate at the time of
the husband's death, ( 3) the after tax rate of return
of the wife and the children at the time of the husband's death, and ( 4) the life expectancy of the
wife at the husband's death. The solution offered to
this problem of the unknown variables was simply to
postpone the ultimate decision about the size of the
transfer from the husband to the wife until after the
date of the husband's death, at which time most of
the above variables would either have become known
or at least estimable with a greater degree of accuracy. The procedure suggested to effect this postponed decision was to leave the entire estate to the
wife and then allow her, with advice of counsel, to
determine the optimum transfer and then to disclaim
the ownership of (but not the benefit from) the remaining portion of the husband's estate. This action
would result in the property so disclaimed being excluded from the wife's gross estate at her later death,
even though she retained the benefit therefrom for the
rest of her life. The only property that would be included in her gross estate would be the optimum
portion of her husband's estate of which she had accepted ownership. The article concluded by presenting "form" language that might be used by an attorney desiring to employ the optimum marital deduction concept, a general discussion of the problems
and opportunities therein, and its integration with
existing Virginia law.

1n the spring of 19 7G the federal government issued
Rev. Rul. 76-156 2 which, though not aimed at the
above plan, nevertheless came down hard on the
use of disclaimers and placed the above procedure for
obtaining the optimum marital deduction clearly in
jeopardy. Accordingly, an update to the original
article was published in these pages in which the
ruling in question was discussed and a minor modification to the original procedure was outlined which
would preserve the essence of the above plan and
render it invulnerable to successful attack under the
revenue ruling in question. 3
Now, in the wake of the Tax Reform Act of 1976,
it becomes necessary to write what it is hoped will
be the final portion of this unintended trilogy. First
of all the good news~the essence of the original plan
still survives. Moreover, the concept of drafting for
the optimum marital deduction has even greater
validity after TRA '76 than it did under prior law.
This greater validity is due to three primary factors:
( 1) the introduction of several new variables in the
amount of the marital deduction and in the amount
of the unified credit which now make it even more
difficult to determine the optimum marital transfer
at the time of drafting the will, ( 2) the minimum
effective estate tax rate of 3 2 % (after the unified
credit is fully phased in) which requires the estate
planner to pay increasing attention to the amount of
assets exposed to estate taxes, whether this exposure
be at the husband's death or the wife's death, and to
eliminate as far as possible all double exposure, and
( 3) the new statutory recognition of disclaimers in
federal law. 4
Moreover, it is no more difficult to employ the
optimum marital deduction disclaimer concept after
TRA '76 than it was under prior law. An attorney
wishing to structure a will to take advantage of this
option will find that it requires very few changes to
his basic marital-deduction will form. He would begin
just as usual, to-wit :

1. Divide the estate into two shares with
whatever formula clause is regularly used,
the appropriate shate going into the "Marital" trust and the other share going into
the "Family" trust.
2

I.R.C. 1976-17, 22.

3 Johnson, An Attack on the Optimum Marital Deduction:
Rcuenue Ruling 76-176, 2 Va. Bar Assn. J. 10 (Summer
1976).

4 I.R.C. ~ 2.118, which is also incorporated by reference into
I.R.C. § 204.'i.
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a. The "Marital" trust will provide that
( 1 ) Wife gets all income for life,
( 2) Trustee has power to invade corpus for wife's benefit, and
( 3) Wife has an inter vivas and testamentary power of appointment
over the corpus, exercisable in
favor of herself, H's kindred and
the spouses of H's kindred, with a
remainder to the "family" trust to
the extent that wife fails to exercise her power.
b. The "Family" trust will provide that
( 1) Wife gets all of the income for life,
( 2) Trustee has power to invade corpus for wife's benefit, but
( 3) Instead of giuing wife a special
testamentary power of appointment exercisable among the children, she is giuen an inter 1•ivos
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and testamentary power of appointment, exercisable in favor
of herself, H's kindred and the
spouses of H's kindred, with an
appropriate remainder in default
of exercise.

2. The "Disclaimer Clause" will provide that:
In the event that my wife ( X) should disclaim the power ( s) of appointment granted
her in Article ________ , above, either as to all
of my estate or to any undivided portion
thereof, then, as to such property over
which the power has been so disclaimed,
I give XYZ Bank these power (s) of a ppointment, to be exercisable in favor of
my wife, my kindred, and spouses of my
kindred; to be exercised as the XYZ Bank,
in the sole exercise of its absolute discretion, shall determine to be best in the
light of circumstances existing at the time
of such exercise. The power(s) of appointment herein given to the XYZ Bank may
be exercised at any time or times during
my said wife's lifetime,
a. By deed presently operative which is delivered during the lifetime of my said
wife, or
b. By a testamentary writing in the nature
of a will which is ( 1 ) designed to become operative simultaneously with the
death of my said wife and ( 2) shall be
revocable during her lifetime.
To the extent that the power( s) are not
validly exercised, the property subject to
the powers shall be paid over to and become a part of. the "Family" trust as it is
constituted immediately after the death of
my said wife.
While the overall operation of the optimum marital
deduction disclaimer plan remains in general as
described in the earlier articles, to which the reader
is hereby referred, it is necessary to make a few
comments concerning the present modifications. First
of all, the rather cumbersome description of the objects of the powers in the marital and family trusts
("herself, H's kindred and the spouses of H's kindred") is mandated by a literal reading of IRC
§ 2518 ( b) ( 4) which requires that a disclaimed power
must pass to another in order to be recognized as a
"qualified disclaimer." The cumbersome language referred to above is drafted with a view in mind of
( 1) giving the wife her general power of appointment to use as necessary and ( 2) giving the fiduciary
bank the power to appoint among the natural objects
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of the husband's bounty if the power passes to the
bank by way of disclaimer. Secondly, paralleling the
position taken above of giving the successor donee
the power to appoint to precisely the same objects as
the original donee, it is provided that the successor
donee must operate in precisely the same time frame
and manner of appointment as the original donee (by
deed delivered or instrument in the nature of a will
executed in the lifetime of the wife) . While it seems
that IRC § 2518 (b) ( 4) was inadvertently made
applicable to powers and that future regulations
will clarify the matter, prudence demands that the
above conservative approach be taken until that
time. Finally, on the matter of partial disclaimers,
IRC § 2518 ( c) ( 1) speaks in terms of disclaiming an
"undivided portion" of an interest. Again, conservative drafting dictates expressing the quantum of the
disclaimer in terms of an undivided portion, rather
than a specific amount, in order to insure that the
donee is making a "qualified disclaimer" as that term
is defined in IRC § 2518 (b).
In conclusion, it is believed that the need for
optimizing the marital-deduction is even greater after
the passage of TRA '76 than it was before, and that
the procedure presented in these articles is even
sounder now that the subject of disclaiming powers
of appointment is expressly treated in IRC § 2518. 5
5 It is believed that any question concerning the soundness
of this concept was laid to rest on April 28, 1977, when House
Ways and Means Chairman Al Ullman introduced H.R.
6715, "The Technical Corrections Act of 1977," which is
designed to make "technical, clerical and conforming" amendments to the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
Section 3 ( m) of the Bill "clarifies" the original intent of
Congress in the enactment of the new disclaimer section,
I.R.C. ~ 2518. The official summary of the Bill, prepared by
the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, explains this
"clarifying" change as follows:
It is presently unclear as to whether a disclaimer is valid
for tax purposes where a surviving spouse refuses to accept all or a portion of an interest in property passing
from the decedent and, as a result of that refusal, the
property passes to a trust in which the spouse has an
income interest. The bill provides that, where a surviving
spouse refuses to accept an interest in property, the disclaimer will be valid although the surviving spouse receives an income interest with respect to the property if
the income interest does not result from any direction
by the surviving spouse and the disclaimer is otherwise
qualified. Summary, pages 29-30.

This "clarification" goes far beyond the relatively conservative procedure of disclaiming a power of appointment
which passes completely to another and, assuming that this
"clarification" remains in the Technical Corrections Act when
it is passed this fall, any doubt concerning the concept described in this series of articles should cease.

